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JAMES P. GEORGE*
Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal Aid
If the ideal of justice is not pervasive in the United States, the
issue of justice is-not so much in its rendition, but in its penetration
of news, politics and entertainment. Current media issues include
the death penalty-erroneous convictions and the lack of lawyers for
appeals'; tort reform-conflicting data on medical malpractice litiga-
tion 2 and a perceived abuse of class actions; and the judiciary itself-
judicial selection, political attacks on so-called "activist judges,"3 and
the sometimes hidden issue of court budgets. Within this fascination,
the multiple problems in accessing justice are lost.
Legal news becomes entertainment with the periodic carnival of
celebrity criminal trials which cluster like natural disasters. Taking
a half-step back to fictional accounts, television programming in the
United States presents the irony of numerous series concerning law-
yers and/or law enforcement, but dealing little with access to the sys-
tem it depicts. CSI (for Crime Scene Investigation) is a police drama
about forensic work and was American television's top-rated show for
the 2002-03 and 2003-04. For the week June 20-26, 2005, the top 20
broadcast television shows included eight crime or court-related
shows,4 likely with no mention of access issues. To the contrary,
these shows create the impression that litigants have lawyers as a
matter of course and that courts are readily available within the
hour.
Justice-as-politics is another aspect of entertainment. Wrench-
ing public policy questions parade in front of us, yet political plat-
* Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. For their valua-
ble input, I thank Jack Coe, Jim Cuaderes, Lawrence Friedman, Steve Hayes, David
Hyman, Andrew Spiropoulos, Justice Sue Walker; my colleagues Wendy Law and
Anna Teller, my research assistants Morad Fakhimi, Scott Petty and Nikki Wood,
and the helpful people at the National Center on State Courts and the Administrative
Office at the United States Courts.
1. Crystal Nix Hines, Lack of Lawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital Cases, N.Y.
Times, July 5, 2001 at Al.
2. Joseph V. Treaster, Malpractice Insurance: No Clear or Easy Answers, N. Y.
Times, March 5, 2003 at Cl (casts doubt on American Medical Association's findings
that damage caps will hold down the sharply rising cost of malpractice insurance).
3. Ron Chernow, Chopping Off the Weakest Branch, N. Y. Times, May 6, 2005 at
A23 (editorial concerning coordinated attacks on the judiciary by conservative politi-
cians and conservative religious leaders).
4. See http://nielsenmedia.com/ratings/broadcast-programs.html (last checked
July 3, 2005).
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forms only vaguely refer to justice. The 2004 Republican Party
platform in its defense of exclusive heterosexual marriage attacked
the judiciary5 while the Democrat's platform was silent on justice.6
Missing in both platforms is any overt reference to the more wide-
spread problems in access to justice. Access to legal services for indi-
gents and middle-income people has not been a significant issue,
although the Legal Services Corporation remains under attack. A
larger political issue has been the flip side of access to justice-the
perception that lawyers and the legal system have undermined
health care, the manufacturing sector, and other vital American in-
terests. This issue has played out not only in legislatures capping
damage awards and in some cases eliminating legal remedies, but in
increased regulation of attorney fees and more recently, political at-
tacks on the judiciary. The assault on the judiciary includes sharp
funding cuts for court operation in both the state and federal sys-
tems, and on the state level only, denials of judicial pay raises.7
This article is excerpted from a report done for the 17th Interna-
tional Congress of Comparative Law, a quadrennial convention of
lawyers and scholars. The full report on the United States is 47
pages, responding to questions posed by Professor Ugo Mattei to re-
porters from several countries. Space limitations for this symposium
issue required the omission of much of the study, but readers want-
ing a copy of the full report may obtain it from the author.8 The se-
lections here highlight the so-called litigation explosion in the United
States and the costs of maintaining its court systems, with abridged
5. Under the heading "Protecting Our Families," the platform states: "President
Bush said, 'We will not stand for judges who undermine democracy by legislating
from the bench and try to remake America by court order." See www.gop.com/medial
2004platform.pdf at page 84. The platform then mentioned the Republicans' support
for an amendment to the Defense of Marriage Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp.
2005). The original act denied full faith and credit status to any one state's judicial
finding in support of same-sex marriage, and the amendment-now termed the Mar-
riage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100-strips federal courts of jurisdiction to con-
sider the original act's constitutionality. The bill is currently in subcommittee. See
http://thomas.loc.gov.cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.01100:. The platform continues: "We
urge Congress to use its Article III power to enact this into law, so that activist fed-
eral judges cannot force 49 other states to approve and recognize Massachusetts' [sic]
attempt to redefine marriage." See www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf at page 84.
6. See www.dems2004.org. The current Democratic Party website endorses one
aspect of access to justice in its support of "Civil Rights and Justice" but offer no
specifics. See http://www.democrats.org/agenda.html.
7. See infra note 54.
8. My email is pgeorge@law.txwes.edu. Topics raised in Professor Mattei's ques-
tionnaire but omitted here include the stigma to suing or being sued; the principal of
innocence until proven guilty as limiting the stigma for criminal defendants; the
structure of attorney fees; the costs of litigation to the consumer; the costs of specific
lawsuits; legal insurance; pro bono practice; public interest law firms; sources for con-
sumers obtaining legal advice; the use of criminal litigation as a substitute for civil
litigation; victims' rights in the criminal process; victims' prosecution of crimes; and
additional information on legal aid for low income clients.
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discussions of other topics such as the consumer's costs in litigating
and legal services for low income clients.
I. THE INSTITUTIONS OF JUSTICE
Any attempt to measure justice or its access must start with the
institutions cloaked with the power to render justice. Since the elimi-
nation of tribal and feudal courts, the Anglo-American system has
depended on courts of law for the resolution of private disputes, and
increasingly for public disputes. But the law courts' dominance has
been periodically modified and even preempted by alternative sys-
tems such as equity, and more recently arbitration and other forms of
dispute resolution that offer, or at least purport to offer, significant
alternatives to traditional courts. The United States today uses a
number of these systems both to supplement and in some cases re-
place litigation. In measuring access, these institutions could be ex-
amined on any number of issues; this study will focus on two crucial
issues-the volume of business in the courts and the costs of main-
taining courts as our primary means of resolving disputes.
A. Courts
Courts in the United States are divided into state and federal
systems in which state courts are the courts of general jurisdiction
and federal courts have limited jurisdiction as outlined in the United
States Constitution and further specified by Congress. Federal
courts are organized into 91 districts exercising trial and some appel-
late jurisdiction, 13 intermediate courts of appeal, and one Supreme
Court. In addition, Congress has created a number of other special-
ized tribunals which adjudicate such matters as bankruptcy cases,
contract claims against the government, appeals from administrative
agency decisions, and disputes in United States territories.9 Most
states court systems mirror the federal system with trial-level courts,
intermediate appellate courts and a single high court, although vari-
ations exist. 10 State court systems also have lower-level trial courts
with jurisdiction limited both by subject matter and amount in con-
troversy; these are often denominated as county courts and small
claims courts." Many Indian tribes maintain courts with limited ju-
9. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 6th ed. (2002) Chaps. 1-6; JAMES P. GEORGE, THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR
(2001) 1-32.
10. Some states have no intermediate appellate courts, and two states-
Oklahoma and Texas-have twin high courts exercising civil and criminal
jurisdiction.
11. In some but not all jurisdictions, small claims judges must be licensed attor-
neys. Another distinction from district courts and county courts is that small claims
courts are, in most states, not courts of record. That is, there is no court reporter
recording the proceedings. Where appeal is available from these courts, it is often an
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risdiction over a variety of matters such as family law and criminal
offenses. 12
1. Court Usage
a. Percentage of the population as plaintiff or defendant: Reliable
estimates for this are nearly impossible because of the variety of law-
suits and the varying number of parties in each suit, ranging from
one plaintiff and one defendant to thousands of parties. The most
recent data available for both state and federal litigation is for the
year 2002. In that year, there were 97,887,356 actions filed in state
trial courts (or courts of the first instance). In the same year, there
were 1,835,412 actions filed in federal district courts. Thus, in 2002
the total number of suits filed in state and federal courts in the
United States was 99.72 million. The 2000 census estimated the
United States population to be 281,421,906 as of April 1, 2000. With
this rough comparison of 2002 filings to the 2000 population, there
were a little under 100 million legal actions filed in state and federal
courts in 2002 for a population somewhat over 281 million. This
number fails to account for the number of parties in each suit, and for
the number of disputes with parallel or multiple filings (that is, P
sues D who in turn sues P for a mirror-image claim in a second
court).13
b. The number of lawsuits: A litigation explosion is widely per-
ceived in the United States, and as with other issues, the data can be
read to support diametrically opposed positions that (1) Americans
are the most litigious people on earth, and alternatively (2) we're
about average. 14 Some attempt at objectivity may be had by looking
at the numbers compiled by courts, although the numbers below are
only the briefest sketch of the data compiled and compared by the
state and federal judiciaries. In regard to state court litigation, the
most recent data measures the period from 1993 to 2002, showing
that during that time: (1) civil cases increased by 14 percent in state
courts of general jurisdiction, and by 10 percent in state courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction; (2) domestic relations cases increased by 14 percent;
appeal de novo in the district court. This means that the "appeal" is not a review of a
trial record (because there is none), but is instead a new trial.
12. See generally ROBERT N. CLINTON et al., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NA-
TIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 4th ed. at 339-43 (2003). For a focused discussion of
one tribe's judicial experience, see RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHER-
OKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT (1975).
13. For state court data, see http://www.ncsconline.org. For federal court data,
see www.uscourts.gov.
14. See John Cochran, A Simple Case of Complexity, CQ WEEKLY, January 31,
2005 at 230 (hereinafter A Simple Case of Complexity). Critics were condemning the
litigation explosion twenty years ago, and their accuracy then, too, was questionable
at best. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE: WHAT AMERICANS WANT FROM
THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND WHY (1985) at 15-23 (hereinafter TOTAL JUSTICE).
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and (3) criminal cases increased by 19 percent. Combined civil, crimi-
nal and domestic relations cases have grown 15 percent from 1993 to
2002. Traffic prosecutions are the largest segment (60 percent of all
filings) and they've remained constant, with a two percent increase
from 1993 to 2002. Thus the 15 percent growth was in civil, domestic
and non-traffic criminal.15 In an interesting though dated compari-
son of state and federal caseloads, a 1993 study found that state
courts of general jurisdiction handled 85 times as many criminal
cases and 27 times as many civil cases as federal courts, but with
only 14 times as many judges. 16 This comparison is misleading,
though, because of the significant difference in case complexity be-
tween state and federal courts. All cases in federal court involve ei-
ther breaches of federal law or non-federal claims exceeding $75,000,
with most federal lawsuits having claims far higher, making not only
the trial but the pretrial discovery phase far more complicated. In
addition, federal judges must commit more to a written record than
state judges.
Federal litigation has also increased, owing both to Congress's
expansion of federal jurisdiction and the growing American and
global economy. In fiscal year 2004 (FY 2004) district court filings
increased nine percent, with 281,338 civil filings (an 11.2 percent in-
crease over FY 2003), and criminal filings remaining roughly even
with 71,022 filings (up .5 percent over FY 2003).17 Bankruptcy fil-
ings fell 2.6 percent this year, but remain high at 1,618,987, up 83.3
percent from FY 1995.18 Although the new bankruptcy act President
Bush signed on April 20, 2005, may lower filings over time, the imme-
diate result no doubt will be a spike in filings to clear the proposed
act's effective date, scheduled in the current bill for 180 days after the
act's adoption.' 9 For the courts of appeals, FY 2004 was the tenth
consecutive year of increases with 62,762 appeals filed, up 3.1 per-
cent over FY 2003 and up 25 percent in the past decade.20 More sig-
nificantly, the appellate courts are slowing in case resolution, with
cases pending at the end of FY 2004 up 14.3 percent from FY 2003.21
Since 1990-the date of the most recent comprehensive federal judge-
ship bill-no new federal appellate judgeships have been created
15. See Examining the Work of State Courts-2003, available at www.
ncsconline.org.
16. See Caseload Highlights,Volume 1, Number 1, available at www.ncsconline.
org.
17. See Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts-2004 at 11 (found at http://www.us
courts.gov/judbus2004/contents.html).
18. Id.
19. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 109th
Congress, 1st Session, Jan. 7 2005, Pub.L. 109-8 (S-256), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 23,
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even though the appeals docket has grown by 46 percent in that time,
while in the same period, 34 new federal district judgeships were cre-
ated to meet a 39 percent docket increase. 22
In considering the current budget shortages for federal courts, a
more important pictures emerges in examining the past 20 years.
From 1960 to 2004, civil filings increased from 59,284 to 281,338 (475
percent) while the number of judges increased from 245 to 679 (277
percent).23 From 1977 (this second table's starting year) to 2004, civil
filings increased from 133,929 to 281,338 (210 percent); during this
time federal question filings increased 284 percent (from 58,083 to
165,241) while diversity filings increased at the lesser rate of 213 per-
cent (from 31,735 to 67,624),24 showing not only growth, but that
growth is more attributable to Congress's federalization of the law
than it is to diversity litigation.25
Whether these figures for state and federal courts amount to a
litigation explosion is difficult to say. The state courts' collective
caseload greatly exceeds that of the federal courts with a significantly
small judge to case ratio. On the other hand, federal courts are
quickly catching up. Filing increases in state court do not appear to
exceed population growth (15 percent increase in 10 years), while
those in federal court do (475 percent increase in 45 years). In his
1983 book Total Justice, Professor Lawrence Friedman cites several
studies showing that contrary to popular belief, Americans have
about the same litigation rate as other industrialized countries, and
that significant aberrations exist-both high and low-in other
countries. 26
c. The appeal rate: For state courts, the National Center for State
Courts issued its most recent report in 2003, based on 2002 data. The
NCSC does not track the filings of appeals linked to the original filing
in the trial court.27 For 2002, the NCSC reports that 95.9 million
actions of all types were filed in state courts of original jurisdiction,
and that in the same year, 297,000 appeals were filed in state courts.
22. Administrative Office of the United States Courts News Release: Conference
Calls Off-Site Security for Judges Top Priority, March 15, 2005, at 2 (found at www.us
courts.gov/PressReleases/index.html) (herinafter Off-Site Security).
23. Table 2.11, U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, Pending
(found at http://uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.11.pdf).
24. Table 2.01, U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, Pending
(found at http://uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.11.pdf).
25. See American Bar Assoc., The Federalization of Federal Criminal Law,
(James Strazella, Reporter, 1998) at 10 (available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
fedreport.html; or can be purchased at ababooks.org).
26. See DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004) at 29-30 (hereinafter ACCESS
TO JUSTICE); TOTAL JUSTICE, supra note 14 at 15-23.
27. The apparent reason is that district court actions filed in any given year will
not all reach final judgment in the same year, thus requiring a case-by-case tracking
linked both to the filing year and the appeal year, which is no doubt difficult. Instead
the NCSC tracks the number of filings in the various state appellate courts in a given
year, grouped by civil and criminal appeals.
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This works out to a .003 appeal rate, or three-tenths of one percent of
the total cases filed. Note, however, that of the 95.9 million cases
filed, 57.7 million were traffic-related (not including civil claims for
traffic accidents). When limited to civil, domestic relations, criminal
and juvenile actions filed, the number is 38.5 million. Assuming that
the vast majority of appeals came from this smaller pool, the appeal
rate is .007, or .07 of one percent.
Federal appeals are more difficult to track. In a practice identi-
cal to that of the National Center for State Courts, the Administra-
tive Office of the United States District Courts (the "AO") does not
specifically track percentage of cases appealed. As explained above,
the likely reason is that district court actions filed in any given year
will not reach final judgment in the same year, thus requiring a case-
by-case tracking linked both to the filing year and the appeal year,
which is apparently too difficult. Instead the AO tracks the number
of filings in the Circuit Courts of Appeal in a given fiscal year
(grouped by administrative appeals, criminal appeals, civil appeals,
and original actions). In FY 2004, criminal appeals increased by four
percent (up to 12,506) and civil appeals fell four percent (down to
33,075). In all appellate filings (including administrative appeals
and original actions), criminal appeals accounted for 20 percent of the
appellate caseload. Note that prisoner habeas appeals are tallied as
civil actions, and in FY 2004 there were 1,130 filed.
In spite of the federal court AO's failure to track percentage of
cases appealed, we may estimate the number as follows. In FY 2004,
there were 352,360 total filings in federal district court (281,338 civil
and 71,022 criminal). In the same FY 2004, there were 62,762 filings
in the Circuit Courts of Appeal (the Administrative Office of United
States Courts does not break them down for civil and criminal). 28 If
the FY 2004 appeal filings were all from a year similar to the FY
2004 district court filings, this would be a 17.8 percent appeal rate.
Of course this result is likely inaccurate because the FY 2004 appeals
were drawn from earlier years' district court filings, and not all in the
same year. Noting that district court filings increase nine percent
from FY 2003 to FY 2004, it may be assumed that the appeal filings
were drawn from a somewhat smaller district court pool than the one
in FY 2004, thus pushing the 17.8 percent up, perhaps to 20 percent.
This number also fails to account for how many civil cases were ap-
peal and how many criminal.
d. The settlement rate: In its 2003 report (based on 2002 data),
the National Center for State Courts reported that for a ten state
study (based on states that reported comparable data), that seven
percent of the civil cases resulted in a jury trial or bench trial. The
remaining 93 percent of the caseload is not distinguished between
28. See supra note 17.
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voluntary dismissal, involuntary dismissal, and summary judgment,
or agreed judgment (where settlements would most likely be ac-
counted for in the voluntary dismissals and the agreed judgments).
The Administrative Office for the Federal Courts does not keep sepa-
rate data on this.
2. Court Efficiency
However accessible courts may be for filing claims and issuing
process, however affordable the attorneys, and however convenient
the procedural rules for the pro se litigant, the delivery of justice is
compromised by an inefficient system. Efficiency may be measured
in any number of ways, but two important measures are court delays,
and the ability of the system to compensate victims and assess the
costs against wrongdoers and not innocent third parties. The Ameri-
can system has a mediocre score on the first and a lower score on the
second.
a. Justice delayed: Litigation delays are the subject of complaint
but are difficult to measure. We may speculate that they are becom-
ing more common because of the increased complexity of litigation
and because of legislative short-funding in both in state and federal
courts. Neither the state nor the federal systems collect date on time
from filing to resolution. For federal courts, however, we may get a
hint by measuring the case backlog, tracked as "cases terminated"
versus "cases left pending." At the close of FY 2004 there was an 11.1
percent increase in the number of civil cases pending and a 10.8 per-
cent increase in criminal cases pending, over the number for FY
2003. In addition, FY 2004 was the first time in five years that the
federal district courts terminated fewer cases in the year than those
left pending; for civil cases, federal courts have terminated fewer
cases than those left pending for the past four years. If this depicts a
trend, then the backlog is growing.
Unlike the federal court system, state courts have no collective
data on pending cases at the end of calendar or fiscal years. This
leaves almost no means of measuring the composite state court sys-
tem, and I'm not aware of any published data for individual states,
though some no doubt collect it. In 2001, the National Center for
State Courts published a study entitled Caseload and Timeliness in
State Supreme Courts, measuring various aspects of high appellate
resolution in five states. The study concluded that the studied states'
supreme courts were reasonably timely overall, but with significant
variations explained in part by the variety of their respective
caseloads. 29
29. See Caseload and Timeliness in State Supreme Courts, Caseload Highlights,
Vol. 7, No. 2, available at www.ncsconline.org.
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b. Efficiency of the civil and/or criminal justice system apart
from delays: For the question, is the civil/criminal justice system con-
sidered efficient, at least by the public, the answer depends on whom
your ask, but will often be "no." On the question of whether it is effi-
cient, the answer depends on which efficiencies we are measuring.
On the issue of the overall cost/benefit ratio, there are arguments on
both (or several) sides, as reflected elsewhere in this article. But if
we narrow efficiency to whether the system rewards the victim and
accurately imposes the costs on the wrongdoer, the answer in too
many instances is "no." In what may be one of the more reliable stud-
ies (gathered by law professor David Hyman but based on data gener-
ated by medical schools), the evidence paints a bad picture of the
American legal system's efficiency:
-about four percent of hospital patients suffer an adverse
event, 50 percent of which are preventable and 25 percent
of which are caused by negligence;
-thus, one percent of hospital patients are victims of negli-
gence, with consequences ranging from complete recovery
within one month (46 percent of those injured) to death (25
percent of those injured), amounting to an estimated
200,000 deaths yearly in the United States caused by med-
ical negligence;
-about two percent of those negligently injured file a claim,
with the percentage increasing as the severity of the in-
jury increases;
-while only a small number of the truly injured patients
sue, a substantial majority of the suits filed involved no
negligence and/or no injury;
-comparing the two, the second problem is dwarfed by the
first-for every invalid claim filed, seven valid claims go
unfiled;
-for the cases filed, the best predictor of the size of the
award is the severity of the disability, not the presence of
negligence (although Professor Hyman does not explain
how the study determined that the judge or jury got it
wrong);
-for every dollar that goes to an injured patient or the
heirs, two dollars are spent getting it there.30
30. See David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We
Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It? 80 TEx. L. REV. 1639, 1643-44
& notes 8-14 (2002) (based on data from various articles in the New England Journal
of Medicine and other medical journals). The medical studies determined the validity
of claims based on a three-person panel's review of evidence, as reported in the
studies.
2006] 301
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
No matter what reforms are implemented, the task of making the
system efficient without sacrificing justice may be problematic.
However, to the extent that negative studies blame the law or law-
yers for these results, Lawrence Friedman's point is well taken that
lawyers did not create the current system, but merely responded to
the advances in science and technology, and to societal demands.3 1
That is not to say that lawyers aren't part of the problem (for exam-
ple, with frivolous lawsuits), but only that lawyers did not create the
science that made negligence law possible.
c. Eliminating nuisance suits: It is axiomatic that defendants
have inherent burdens in being defendants. The burdens vary with
the case, influenced by:
-The lawsuit's complexity, including the nature of the claim
(antitrust claims are more complex than most breaches of
contract); the number of additional parties; the need to as-
sert counterclaims or crossclaims;
-Defendants resources relative to this complexity;
-Discovery (both plaintiffs and defendant's) which even in
a simple two-party lawsuit may be expensive, intrusive
and time consuming;
-The supersedeas bond in the event defendant loses at trial
and wishes to appeal; 32
-Concerns about later liability because of preclusion, thus
increasing the need to put up a strong defense.
Scientific and technological improvements-photocopiers, word
processors, email, demonstrative evidence-have increased these
burdens in recent decades, but to the extent a defendant finds itself
in a legitimate dispute, the burdens are unfortunate but for the most
part necessary. A significant problem is the frivolous or nuisance
lawsuit, aimed at nothing more than coercing a settlement in order to
avoid these burdens. Nuisance suits are those lacking merit, either
because the defendant has suffered no compensable damage or be-
cause the defendant did not cause it. The motive in filing the suit is
the hope of negotiating a "nuisance-value" settlement, which may be
anywhere from a few thousand dollars for a routine lawsuit, up to
31. See TOTAL JUSTICE, supra note 14 at 70-72.
32. Some states require defendants who have lost at trial to post a security bond
for the full judgment plus the estimated interest in order to stay judgment enforce-
ment pending appeal. Texas followed this practice and its burdensome nature be-
came apparent in Pennzoil's well-publicized claim against Texaco, in which Texaco
claimed an inability to post a $13 billion bond. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481
U.S. 1 (1986); see also Bishop & Sarles, Supersedeas Bonds A Crushing Burden, NA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 13, 1995 at C25. Texas has since amended its bond re-
quirement to cap them at the lower of $25 million or fifty percent of the defendant's
net worth, and to allow for hearings to challenge any other burdens that might arise.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 52.006 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
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several tens of thousands of dollars for more complex cases. Nui-
sance value may be determined by any means the parties choose, but
is often based on defendant's estimated costs in preparing for and
going through trial. Some critics of the current American system be-
lieve the nuisance settlement has done more real harm to the Ameri-
can legal system than the more disputed claims about runaway
juries.33 The nuisance settlement must be distinguished from settle-
ments in which defendant firmly denies liability and may indeed feel
blameless, but nonetheless pays a large portion of plaintiffs claim
based on defendant's estimate of the chances of being found liable.
Although these defendants may come away from the case angry, few
if any advocates of tort reform are arguing overtly on their behalf.
On the other hand, much of the results of tort reform will benefit
these defendants just as much as those who are victims of the nui-
sance suit.
One other aspect of nuisance litigation-seldom if ever written
about-is the nuisance defense, raising frivolous arguments through-
out the pretrial phase and possibly into the trial or appeal. Some
defense lawyers and clients will argue that this is no more than con-
ducting a proper defense, that is, pursuing an argument until the evi-
dence demonstrates its falsity. But the same can be said of the
frivolous plaintiffs claim. Although plaintiff or any opposing party
may ask the court to eliminate frivolous claims early in the case,
many courts are reluctant to act until discovery is concluded. Be-
cause frivolity deals more with grays than blacks and whites, this
problem is not easily resolved. It is nonetheless a factor in the na-
tion's litigation costs.
B. Alternatives to Courts
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) schemes vary among juris-
dictions, as do the requirement for the people administering them.
The most common, along with their qualifications, are arbitration,
collaborative law,3 4 judicial settlement conferences, mediation,35 the
33. See Testimony of Andrew Spiropolous before the Oklahoma Council of Public
Affairs, found at http://www.ocpathink.org/ViewResearchAndIdeasStory.asp. See
also ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26 at 24-29, 33, 194. In a class action regarding
silicosis claims, a Texas federal judge recently dismissed a significant number of
claimants and accused plaintiffs' lawyers and doctors of offering unreliable diagnoses.
See Mike Tolson, Attorneys Behind Silicosis Suits Draw U.S. Judge's Wrath, HousToN
CHRONICLE, July 1, 2005 at Al.
34. Collaborative processes are often used in divorce. The parties agree not to
litigate and instead conduct a series of meetings that are more involved that media-
tion, and involve counsel, experts and others, with everyone committed to reaching a
solution. See generally KAY ELKINS ELLIOTT & FRANK ELLIOTT, eds., ALTERNATIVE Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK (State Bar of Texas ADR Section, Imprimatur Press,
2003) (hereinafter "ADR HANDBOOK").
35. Mediation is the parties' attempt to reach an agreement with the help of a
mediator-a "third party neutral" who serves to facilitate communication and negoti-
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mini-trial,3 6 the moderated settlement conference,37 negotiation, and
private judging.38
ADR clauses are now included in many standard contracts with
banks, insurance companies, utilities providers, and so on. Whether
the clause is binding, that is, whether the other party may ignore it
and sue, depends both on the clause's drafting and the nature of the
contract. Properly drafted arbitration clauses that indicate the par-
ties agreement for mandatory arbitration (that is, they exclude litiga-
tion), are enforceable in both state and federal courts in the United
States, subject to exceptions such as waiver, and statutory exceptions
for certain contracts.39
Some states build arbitration schemes into statutory remedies,
such as the new Texas law regarding warranty claims on new home
construction.40 States may require mediation or negotiation as a pre-
requisite to certain remedies. 41 Where state law does not address
ation and not to make an fact or legal findings in the dispute. Mediators in general
have no training or certification process in most states, except for court-ordered medi-
ation, which often requires licensing. Under Texas law, court annexed mediation re-
quires a mediator who has completed forty hours of classroom training from a group
approved by the court; family mediation requires an additional twenty-four classroom
hours. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §H 154.052(a) - (c) (Vernon 2005).
36. The mini-trial is non-binding, similar to a summary jury trial, but conducted
in private and argued not to a judicial functionary, but to the parties themselves;
Mini-trials are argued by the parties' counsel, and argued to the parties themselves;
thus the only required training is to be in a dispute. A variation on this is the sum-
mary jury trial-a shortened trial with non-binding results that will give the parties a
jury's perception and thereby facilitate negotiations. See Judge Thomas D. Lambros,
The Summary Jury Trial and other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Re-
port to the Judical Conference of the United States Committe on the Operation of the
Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
37. This is a private, nonbinding process in which the litigants and their attor-
neys meet with a private panel of three attorneys who evaluate the case. Moderated
settlement conferences typically use a panel of three attorneys. See ADR HANDBOOK,
supra note 34 at 119-34.
38. Private judging is a binding non-jury trial for which a retired judge is hired.
Private judges's qualifications vary, but many states require judicial experience.
Texas, for example, requires that "special judges" be retired district, county, or appel-
late judges who served as judges for at least four years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code §§ 151.001 et seq. (Vernon 2005); see also Cal. Const. Art. 6, § 21; Cal. Civ. P.
Code § 638 (West Supp. 2005).
39. See the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 1994); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). The Federal Arbitration Act, for example,
applies to most employment agreements but exempts contracts involving interstate
transportation workers. See Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act pre-empts binding arbitration clause in consumer
sales contracts. See Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala.
1997). See generally BETTE J. ROTH, et al., 1 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRAC-
TICE GUIDE at § 6.2 (2004).
40. See Texas Residential Construction Commission Act, Tex. Prop. Code
§§ 436.001-.004 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
41. Some state remedies, particularly for consumer claims, required a "cooling off"
period during which negotiation must be attempted. The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, for example, requires consumers to provide
notice to the prospective defendant sixty days prior to filing a lawsuit, and during
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ADR, courts may insist on some schemes including mediation, negoti-
ation and the judicial settlement conference. Others occur on the
parties' initiative, including the mini-trial and the collaborative pro-
cess. Some-arbitration in particular-are used as alternatives to
litigation, and have become common both in routine disputes such as
credit card claims and homeowner's warranty claims against the
builder, and in larger cases such as employment (both individual em-
ployment complaints and large labor disputes), environmental cases
and commercial disputes. ADR has also found its way into criminal
cases. In many states, people claiming to be crime victims are en-
couraged (and the defendant may be required) to mediate.4 2 Other
ADR schemes, such as using a special judge or conducting a mock
trial, are voluntary.
II. THE COSTS OF COURTS
The broader report from which this section is drawn looks in de-
tail at both micro and macro costs, that is, the costs to the consumer
for filing and paying other fees during litigation and arbitration, and
the taxpayer costs of financing the judicial and prosecutorial system.
This article briefly summarizes individual consumer costs and fo-
cuses on court funding.
A. Micro Costs-The Impact on the Legal Consumer
Court costs in the United States have a very rough uniformity.
One plaintiff suing one defendant in a district court (state or federal)
must pay from $100 to $200, with personal service of summons by a
sheriff typically costing $50 to $100. Small claims courts tend to
have lower filing fees but similar service-of-process fees, although a
lower-cost service by mail is usually available for all courts. Later
fees can include a jury fee, exhibit fees, an appeal bond, a superse-
deas bond to secure the judgment (and stop execution) pending ap-
peal, court reporter fees for the trial transcript, fees for abstracting
and executing on the judgment, and a number of costs during discov-
ery for court reporters, audio-visual crews, and so on. Some of these
fees may be waived for low income litigants. Most jurisdictions post
that time, to make the goods available for inspection, Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code
§ 17.505 (Vernon 2002); gives defendant a right to compel mediation within ninety
days of the suit's filing, id. at § 175051; and has an "offer-of-settlement" provision that
allows defendant to make a reasonable offer and thereby limit plaintiffs recovery of
damages, attorney fees and costs, id. at § 17.5052.
42. See Tex. Code Cr. Proc. art. 56.13 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05), which authorizes
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to train mediators and provide mediation
services between victims or their relatives and the offender whose criminal conduct
caused bodily injury or death. See also www.tdjc.state.tx.us/victim/victim-vomd.htm.
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these fees on their websites, as does the American Arbitration
Association.4
B. Macro Costs-the Impact on the United States Government and
the Economy
CQ Weekly, published by Congressional Quarterly, reported that,
"With the 'tort reform' battle long on hype and short on data, experts
say lawmakers first move should be attacking the information gap." 4
The magazine examines a number of tort reform claims as quoted by
elected officials, the insurance industry, plaintiffs' lawyers and
others, and then examines the source cited for each claim. With
every claim cited, the article highlights faulty premises, faulty data,
or both, and concludes that the current debate is little more than a
public relations war founded on unreliable data. With that in mind,
three reports are briefly summarized below.
1. The Towers Perrin Report
Within certain interest groups, especially insurers and busi-
nesses, the Towers Perrin Report is the most-often quoted study.
Paid for by the insurance industry and based on their data, the report
focuses on the costs incurred by insurance companies in annual tort
claims. The Report estimates the 2003 tort costs as $ 245.7 billion, or
2.23 percent of the 2003 GDP of $11 trillion. Twenty years earlier,
the 1983 tort costs were $64.4 billion, or 1.82 percent of the 1983
GDP of $3.5 trillion.45 Tort costs as a percentage of GDP has thus
increased by .041 of a percentage point over 20 years, and the Report
predicts the increase will continue absent continued tort reform
legislation.46
These figures must be read in light of their methodology, which
suggest data errors that would both increase and decrease the esti-
mates. First, costs estimates are limited to the costs incurred by lia-
bility insurers, and do not include (1) the public costs of funding the
court system; (2) costs to plaintiffs that are not recovered in judg-
ments; (3) costs to defendants not reimbursed by insurance; and (4)
perhaps most significantly, private and public costs of tort victims
who never pursue their claims for whatever reason. These omissions,
of course, reduce the cost estimate significantly.
A second methodology question goes to the Report's use of "in-
curred losses" rather than "paid losses." Incurred losses reflect both
payments and the collective change in insurance reserves as a result
43. See http://www.adr.org.
44. A Simple Case of Complexity, supra note 14.
45. Towers Perrin Report at App. 1A.
46. Id. at 2-4.
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of payments, and thus inflate the payments column. 4 7 The Report
justifies this by claiming that to measure merely paid claims would
understate the true costs because, in order to argue otherwise,
one would have to posit that insurers knowingly set reserves
too high. We do not believe this is the case. In fact, some
rating agencies believe that current insurance industry
reserves are, in total, deficient. 4 8
The Report cites no authority for this.
A third methodology question is the Report's use of GDP as an
index for measuring American tort costs, a phenomenon which in-
cludes foreign parties-both plaintiff and defendant-and foreign in-
surers. There is no data as to whether foreign parties' participation
in American litigation is more or less than their participation in the
American economy, but the tort reformers' argument that America is
the venue of choice suggests that GDP may be an arbitrarily low in-
dex that exaggerates the Report's conclusions.
The tone for the Report is best stated in one of its introductory
statements that "[olver the last 50 years, tort costs in the U.S. have
increased more than a hundredfold."4 9 The Report makes no at-
tempt, and in fact does not address, the costs of tort injury at a time
when tort victims went largely uncompensated because, among other
factors, science and medicine were unavailable to prove the injury.
To conclude that it has increased a hundredfold assumes that the
"costs" were almost nil before 1950, when in fact much of the damage
that drove the development of tort law occurred prior to 1950, with
the costs then being borne by the victims.
2. The Costs of Contract Litigation
The National Center for State Courts studied civil trials in a 46
county area, limited to claims regarding contracts or similar agree-
ments such as leases or partnerships. The 46 counties surveyed re-
present roughly 25 percent of the United States population. There
were 2,471 contract-related disputes in those 46 counties in 2001,
and the median award in litigated cases was $78,627. The number of
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 2. The Towers Perrin Report makes no distinction as to what aspects of
tort litigation should be reformed. It does have a short disclaimer that the Report
should not be read as calling for reforms or representing any particular point of view.
The disclaimer is somewhat contradicted by the Report's rhetoric. It notes, for exam-
ple, that the current trend is class action lawsuits against boards of directors and
publicly traded companies which will not abate without "sweeping reform"; the Report
offers two examples-"claims against pharmaceutical companies for the alleged ill
effects of drugs and actions against food establishments for obesity-related injuries."
Id. at 3. Once again McDonald's is the straw dog with no mention of claims like those
filed against Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others. So much for objectivity.
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cases (2,471) multiplied by the median award ($78,627) is
$194,287,317. We can make a crude estimate for the United States
by multiplying this total (which represented 25 percent of the United
States population) by four, and that total is $777,149,268, which is a
rough estimate of the cost of contract litigation in the United States
for 2001.50
3. The Census Bureau Report of State and Federal
Government Court Costs
In addition to the decennial census, the United States Bureau of
the Census conducts periodic surveys of various matters of public in-
terest ranging from government to private finance to health. In 2004,
the Census Bureau published its conclusions regarding the state and
federal government costs in operating and staffing their courts. The
report was based on data compiled from the Census Bureau's annual
surveys of governmental finances and employment, based on a survey
sample from the 1997 Census of Local Governments, reporting costs
as of the budget year 2001. The sample comprised large units of gov-
ernment in all 50 states which were sampled with certainty and
smaller units selected with a probability proportional to the unit's
expenditure. The total number of local governments in the finance
sample was 7,002, and the number of local governments in the em-
ployment sample was 10,574. The study attempted to measure gov-
ernment expenditures on "judicial and legal services," defined as
including all civil and criminal courts and activities associated with
courts such as law libraries, grand juries, petit juries, medical and
social service activities, court reporters, judicial councils, bailiffs, and
probate functions. It also includes the civil and criminal justice activi-
ties of the attorneys general, district attorneys, states' attorneys, and
their variously named equivalents and corporation counsels, solici-
tors, and legal departments with various names. It excluded legal
units of noncriminal justice agencies, whose functions may be per-
formed by a legal services department in other jurisdictions (such as
a county counsel).
The study found $10.23 billion in federal judicial and legal ex-
penditures, $14,444 billion in state expenditures, and $15,938 billion
in local expenditures, for a total of $40.61 billion. State and local gov-
ernments spent two percent of their budgets for judicial and legal ser-
vices-the equivalent of $132 per capita. The survey also measured
the number of judicial and legal service employees and found 57,953
50. See Robert C. LaFountain & Neal B. Kauder, The National Center for State
Courts, Caseload Highlights: An Empirical Overview of Civil Trial Litigation, Vol. 11
No. 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdfjeeus01.pdf (February 2005)
(last visited June 21, 2005).
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federal employees, 162,982 state employees, and 267,208 local em-
ployees, for a total of 488,143 judicial and legal-related employees. 5'
4. The Costs of Legal Aid and Public Defender Programs
The FY 2005 budget for the Legal Services Corporation (which
funds regional legal aid programs) is $335 million, reduced to $318
million in President Bush's FY 2006 budget request. 5 2 Legal aid
funding in civil cases is supplemented by private donations and
grants, but those are generally not public funds. Indigent criminal
defense is more difficult to tally. Because criminal defense is consti-
tutionally mandated, much of the budget comes from state or local
governments. The most recent nationwide survey was in 1982 and is
no longer valid. When the United States Justice Department at-
tempted a similar survey in 1999 it ran into insurmountable data col-
lection problems. Two years of efforts produced an estimate of the
costs in the nation's 100 largest counties, and included findings that
(1) within those counties, $1.2 billion was spend in 1999 to handle an
estimated 4.2 million cases; (2) this amount is three percent of the
total criminal justice expenditures in those counties in 1999 ($38 bil-
lion total costs of criminal justice in 100 largest counties; $65 billion
total cost of criminal justice nationwide); and (3) those 100 counties
account for 42 percent of the United States' population, and 44 per-
cent of the population with incomes below the poverty level, and a
slight majority of the crimes committed in the United States. 3
5. Increase/Decrease Over 20 Years
There is no reliable studies as to current overall costs, and there
is no reason to believe that studies of data from 20 years ago are any
more reliable. Accepting the Towers Perrin Report's conclusion that
costs to insurers have increased over the past 20 years (which is no
doubt true), imposing this conclusion on the entire economy is purely
speculative. First, the rise in costs to insurers no doubt includes pay-
ments for injuries such as those caused by toxins that were incurred
in the past, but only recently borne by the tortfeasor. If the calcula-
tion comparing 1984 to now were to include all measures of costs,
including the costs to victims who were not compensated until toxic-
tort litigation developed, it is almost impossible to compare one time
to another.
A more reliable number, limited to government funding for the
federal courts, comes from the Administrative Office of the Federal
51. See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Justice Expendi-
tures and Employment in the United States, 200, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
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Courts. For fiscal year 1985, Congress appropriated $1.04 billion for
the federal judiciary. In fiscal year 2005, Congress appropriated
$5.426 billion, an increase of 422 percent over 20 years, not adjusted
for inflation. Similar numbers for state courts are not available.
In spite of the lack of reliable data, it is an easy conclusion that
the cost of putting on a lawsuit has increased over the past 20 years
because of changes in technology that have created broader discovery
opportunities and high-tech demonstrative evidence. Similarly, the
costs to state and federal governments of budgeting the courts, prose-
cutors and public defenders office has also increased over the past 20
years. Congress and a number of state legislatures are, in effect, re-
ducing court budgets by failing to fund them at a rate that will keep
pace with demands for more judges, more employees, and more
technology. 54
The studies claiming to measure "justice" costs as a function of
the economy are misleading in many ways. One primary flaw is that
instead of measuring overall economic impact, the studies merely
measure the cost to one segment of the economy and fail to address
the admittedly intangible costs of the alternatives. In examining the
costs of asbestos litigation, for example, studies point out that the
resulting corporate bankruptcies cost 52,000 to 60,000 jobs, but failed
to consider now many new jobs were created in the economy by com-
panies manufacturing alternatives.55 Anti-tort rhetoric invariably
fails to address the economic impact of having no legal remedy, or of
the beneficial safety measures that result from tort litigation. But
the studies and resulting rhetoric on the consumer and trial lawyer
side are also unreliable in many instances. This results in a public
policy debate that will generate results based on passion and
misinformation.
III. THE SERVICE PROVIDERS
The availability and costs of advocacy, whether done by the
party, by an attorney, or by a non-attorney is a third crucial compo-
54. For a discussion of the federal judicial budget crisis, see Cost-Containment
Strategy for the Federal Judiciary: 2005 and Beyond, Report of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Aug. 12, 2004, approved by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 21, 2004 (hereinafter Cost-Contain-
ment Report). See also James P. George, Jurisdictional Implications in the Reduced
Funding of Lower Federal Courts, forthcoming in Volume 25 of The Review of Litiga-
tion (2006) and articles cited there. For the same issue with state courts, see Judicial
Symposium Issue, 38 AKRON L. REV. 551 (2004-05); Chief Justice Wallace P. Carson,
Jr., At the Crossroads: Are We Prepared to Dismantle Oregon's 143-Year-Old Court
System? 63 Or. St. Bar Bull. 15 (2003); James T. Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Indepen-
dence, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 277 (1971); Geoffrey C. Hazzard, et al., Court Finance and
Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L. J. 1286 (1972); Jonathan Bunge, Congressional Under-
appropriation for Civil Juries: Responding to the Attack on a Constitutional Guaran-
tee, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 238 n. 3 (1988).
55. See A Simple Case of Complexity, supra note 44 at 237.
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nent in measuring the delivery of justice. This section is the most
abbreviated from the full report, partly because its contents are more
widely distributed than the information in the other sections. Read-
ers wanting the longer version may contact the author.
A. Private Attorneys
Legal consumers who do not qualify for free or reduced-fee ser-
vices will have to employ a private attorney. Fee arrangements vary,
but include hourly fees and for certain cases, a fixed amount. For a
limited category of cases such as personal injury and wrongful death,
lawyers charge contingency fees which are based on a percentage-
varying from 33 to 50 percent-of the client's recovery after costs are
subtracted. The contingency fee makes litigation possible for people
who could not otherwise afford it, and accordingly has been praised
and condemned. Lawyer advertising has been possible as a constitu-
tional right since 1977,56 and like the contingency fee has been her-
alded as making services both lower cost and more available, and in
turn vilified as promoting litigation.57 Lawyer fees are regulated to a
limited extent but remain largely a matter of private contract law.5 8
This rule, however, applies only to the attorney-client fee agreement
and not to the assessment of attorney fees from another party who is
not the client. Thus, if a losing defendant is ordered to pay plaintiffs
attorney fees, the general standard is reasonableness, which is more
restrictive than the unconscionability standard applied to the attor-
ney-client fee agreement. For these instances, attorneys must prove
their charges as part of the claim and courts often reduce the fees
awarded. State and federal laws also place limits on attorney fees
that must be paid by the losing party.59 These explanations and legal
56. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
57. Lawyer advertising is regulated by state law, but good examples of that regu-
lation are found in ABA Model Rules 7.1 - 7.3. These rules generally allow the adver-
tising of services through written, recorded or electronic communications including
public media, so long as the communication is not false or misleading. A lawyer gen-
erally may not, in person or by telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit profes-
sional employment from a prospective client when a significant motive is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain. Thus, lawyers may advertise but are limited in making personal-
contact solicitations. Other limits in some states include barring the use of actors to
portray clients, limiting claims of past successes, and barring referral to jury verdicts
that were later overturned on appeal or substantially reduced.
58. In general, the only regulation of the attorney-client contracting power is that
(1) attorneys must explain, preferably in writing, the basis for the fee and any other
charges; (2) the attorney may not make false or misleading representations or omis-
sions about the attorney or the services provided; and (3) fees may not be unconscion-
able. See ABA Model Rules 1.5(b) & 7.1.
59. Two examples are the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-2,
119 Stat. 4 (effective Feb. 18, 2005) (limiting attorney-fee recovery for successful
plaintiffs' attorneys), and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2678 (West
1994), capping plaintiffs attorney fees at twenty percent of the amount of settlement
during the pre-litigation administrative process, or twenty-five percent of the judg-
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cites should not compel a conclusion that excessive attorney fees are
not an issue in the United States. Local bar organizations routinely
have arbitration panels that, without cost, will review client com-
plaints about excessive fees. On a larger scale, economic studies
often criticize attorney compensation as one problem in both the cost
of legal services, and its unavailability to the middle class client.60
B. Legal Aid and Public Defenders
The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees
legal counsel in criminal prosecutions. This guarantee has not al-
ways been read to require free counsel, but merely the right to have
counsel. It now requires appointed counsel for indigents in cases
where incarceration is possible.6 ' There is no constitutional require-
ment for counsel in civil cases. The only legal requirement is found in
the Legal Services Corporation Act.6 2
In qualifying cases, free legal help is furnished along three basic
systems: (1) the staffed legal aid or public defender model, where at-
torneys are full-time employees; (2) the private contract model, where
individual attorneys or law firms agree to provide some or all of the
jurisdiction's indigent attorney work; and (3) the appointed counsel
model, where the court assigns attorneys who are then paid by a
court or county fund (this is common in criminal defense and rare in
civil matters63 ). For criminal defense, urban areas tend to use the
staffed office model, while in rural areas the assigned counsel model
is more common.64
Public defenders represent eligible low-income clients in criminal
cases, while legal aid attorneys represent both plaintiffs and defend-
ants in a range of civil cases including divorce, child support and cus-
tody, landlord-tenant, consumer, and public entitlement such as
Social Security and state benefits. Legal aid offices will not accept
clients in matters deemed "fee generating", that is, where the claim
likely involves a monetary recovery sufficiently large to induce a pri-
vate attorney to accept the claim on a contingency fee basis. Exam-
ples include personal injury/wrongful death claims and civil rights
claims for government abuse involving injury or death. The fact that
ment or settlement if suit is filed. Attorneys who exceed these amounts may be
charged with a crime punishable by fines up to $2,000 and up to one year in prison.
60. See ACCESS TO JUsTICE, supra note 26 at 33 (overcompensation of lawyers) and
45-46 (excessive legal fees).
61. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 401 U.S. 908 (1972). Over three-quarters of felony
defendants are poor enough to qualify for court-appointed counsel. See ACCESS TO
JUSTICE, supra note 26 at 11.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005). See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra
note 26 at 8-9 for a discussion of the right to counsel in civil cases.
63. Courts have the power to appoint private attorneys in civil cases, and lawyers




a legal aid office offers these services does not mean that it is ade-
quately staffed to handle the demand, and a number of otherwise eli-
gible clients are routinely turned down because of the client overload.
Estimates are that less than one-fifth of the needs of eligible clients is
met-the Bronx Legal Aid Society, for example, has a two-and-a-half
year waiting list for divorces. 65
Criminal defendants in felony cases and some misdemeanor
cases are provided with attorneys, at least for the trial level. Free
attorneys may not be available for the appeal, although several pub-
lic defender offices and law school clinics now do criminal appeal de-
fense. Capital murder cases involving the death penalty, which
would dictate the highest need for the assistance of counsel at every
level, are sometimes without attorneys, or at least adequately trained
attorneys. Professor Rhode cites the misconception that minimally-
qualified defense attorneys will at least prevent the innocent from
being convicted, and then points out recent post-conviction exonera-
tions through DNA evidence.66
For the delivery of legal services to low-income people, the pri-
mary organization in the United States is the Legal Services Corpo-
ration and its regional affiliates.67 Other organizations include the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, providing funding for
both civil and criminal matters;68 the American Bar Association Divi-
sion for Legal Services, providing funding for civil and criminal mat-
ters;69 the American Bar Association Division on IOLTA;70
IOLTA.org-Leadership for Equal Justice;7 1 state programs, such as
the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, which administers
funds from IOLTA accounts and other sources. 72
In spite of these organizations' support, the funds are being cut
back. For FY 2006, President Bush recommended funding of $329
million, a five percent cut from FY 2005.73 Although the United
States has had a federally-funded legal aid system since the time of
President Nixon, and many locally funded ones before that, there re-
mains significant opposition to these services, and on multiple
grounds including that it increases litigation, that it is inefficient
65. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26 at 13, and sources cited there.
66. See id. at 125.
67. See http://lsc.gov. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996 et seq. (West 2003 & Supp. 2005)





72. See http://www.txiolta.org/aboutlindex/html. In the 1990s, the conservative
Washington Legal Foundation challenged IOLTA's legality but lost in two reviews by
the United States Supreme Court. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524
U.S. 156 (1998).
73. See Legal Services Now newsletter, April 15, 2005 at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/sclaid/1sn.html.
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when compared to cash entitlements through which the poor could
choose to pay for legal services or pay for some other commodity, and,
of course, that it unjustifiably helps deadbeats.74
Legal representation for low income clients is also provided by
private volunteers under state and local bar association pro bono pro-
grams, 75 law school legal clinics,76 interest groups focused on specific
subjects like civil rights,77 and to a limited extent by church organi-
zations.78 Middle class legal consumers may also have legal-service
74. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26 at 10-11 and 58-64.
75. ABA Model Rule 6.1 and the laws of several states encourage, and in some
cases require, pro bono practice. Texas law reflects the ABA model rule by making
pro bono service voluntary rather than mandatory. Both recommend fifty hours' ser-
vice a year. In spite of efforts for a mandatory pro bono service as a condition of
licensing, only three states-Florida, Maryland, and New Jersey-require pro bono
service. See AcCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26 at 153.
76. Approximately 170 of the 185 accredited law programs have law clinics offer-
ing services similar to those of legal aid and public defender offices. The precise num-
ber is difficult to pin down, especially in terms of legal services to the poor, because (1)
some law school clinics serve middle class people such as business and tax clinics, and
(2) some schools offering only "simulated clinical" classes such as trial advocacy that
do not serve real clients. The most common services provided are family law matters,
criminal defense (some trial, some appellate, some both), consumer, and landlord-ten-
ant. Not-so-common clinics include environmental law, international human rights,
immigration law, farmworkers, cyberlaw, criminal prosecution, education law, em-
ployment law, and nonprofit organizations/small business, which aren't necessarily
geared to the client's income status. See http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/
lawschools.
77. Public interest groups providing legal services tend to fall into two categories:
(1) access to justice for low income people, and (2) the vindication of specified civil
liberties or other interests. These mostly-privately funded groups are too numerous
to list here, but include the American Civil Liberties Union; the Center for Individual
Rights; the Christian Legal Foundation; the Community Environmental Legal De-
fense Fund; the Mountain States Legal Foundation; the National Lawyers Guild; the
Native American Rights Fund; the Pacific Legal Foundation; the Pro Bono Institute;
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; the Southeastern Legal Founda-
tion; the Southern Poverty Law Center; Trial Lawyers for Public Justice; and the
Washington Legal Foundation. Some larger organizations-those focused more
broadly than on legal services-have public interest legal centers. A few examples
are the the Consumer Resource Center, Earthjustice, the Landmark Legal Founda-
tion, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Resources Defense
Counsel, the National Organization of Women, Ralph Nader's Public Citizen; the
Rutherford Institute, and the Sierra Club. There are also groups with an interna-
tional focus, including Amnesty International and Human Rights First.
78. Three examples are Catholic Charities, the United Methodist Committee on
Relief, and Church World Service Immigration and Refugee Program, all offering le-
gal help to immigrants, particularly political refugees and undocumented workers.
See http://gbgm.umc.org./umcor/refugees.stm; http://www.catholicharitiesusa.org;
http://www.churchworldservice.org/immigration. Religious organizations such as the
Rutherford Institute fund public interest lawsuits vindicating religious liberties and
other issues such as right to life. Other faith-based organizations providing some le-
gal assistance include the Christian Legal Society, Baltimore's Jewish Legal Services,
and Ohio Legal Assistance Foundation's Interfaith Legal Services. See Mary Med-
land, Faith groups to immigrants' defense - Community-based programs spring up to
meet legal needs, National Catholic Reporter, available at http://wwwjewishla.org/
news/html/1204-defense.html (November 12, 2004) (last visited June 20, 2005).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Measuring access to justice is as elusive as measuring justice it-
self. The 47 page report from which this article is drawn merely
highlights the more important issues. Studies on access to justice, in
various conceptions, fill volumes for popular reading and untold
amounts of paper and electronic data for not-so-popular reading, all
doing little more in the past 20 years than fuel arguments.
Many questions remain. Is the current tort docket a litigation
explosion, or merely the proper application of law to injuries now that
medicine and technology can establish causation? Is the American-
ized-version of the English law court system efficient in resolving
twenty-first century disputes? How much should litigation cost the
consumer and the economy? Whatever the dispute-resolution sys-
tem, how can legal advice and advocacy be made available?
A few answers emerge, unpleasantly. On the tort system, even
some critics acknowledge that the run-away jury is a myth. The
problem is the nuisance lawsuit, and it exists only because deep-
pocket defendants are inclined to settle rather than force the plaintiff
to face the consequences of pursuing a frivolous claim. On accessible
legal help, lower-income Americans have access only to a small num-
ber of legal remedies in mostly simple cases. Middle-income Ameri-
cans, ineligible for government-funded attorneys, have less access.
Perhaps most foreboding for access to justice, Congress and some leg-
islatures are attacking the judiciary on jurisdictional, economic and
personal grounds.
Americans, particular American lawyers, believe we were born
into a system founded on the rule of law. Contemplating globaliza-
tion, we like to believe the American legal system offers an adver-
sarial model with features worth emulating. Current studies, though
ambiguous, undermine those beliefs. To the extent these questions
are data driven, we must gather accurate numbers and argue them
accurately. Once armed with better information, we must consider
where we are and where we need to be. The discussion must occur in
our bar associations, in our legislatures, and in international confer-
ences where we can learn, and perhaps have something to offer.
79. Two examples of union benefits including legal services are Union Plus Legal
Services, see http://www.unionplus.com/benefits/legal, and the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, see http://org.teamster.org/tbenefits.htm (last visited June 15,
2005).
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